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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The French Communist Party (PCF) traditionally has been allied 
closely with the Soviet Union and that state's communist party (CPSU). 
Yet, since 1968 an erosion of this relationship has become apparent. 
By charting and analyzing the reactions and official statements of the 
two parties concerning a specific crisis period in Czechoslovakia in 
1968, the beginnings of the strained relations can be determined. The 
membership of the French Communist P~rty, through reports in the of-
1 
ficial party newspaper L'Humanite, was kept well informed and remained 
highly interested in the developments in Czechoslovakia. This con-
trasted markedly with the negative reactions or obvious silence found 
in the CPSU's official party newspaper, Pravda, and among the Soviet 
leadership. The evidence provided by the official party news organs 
illustrated that the PCF differed significantly with the CPSU concern-
ing the entire course of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
The events in Czechoslovakia caused the PCF to reassess its subservient 
position to the party of the Soviet Union. 
A major change in PCF relations with the Soviet Union was of great 
significance. In the case of France (and other Western European states) 
the French Communist Party often challenged non-communist parties for 
control of the government. An independent PCF in power illustrated one 
scenario for France and a PCF subservient to the CPSU illustrated 
1 
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another. Tracing the reactions of the PCF and CPSU to events in Czech-
oslovakia prior to and following the invasion in August provided a ve-
hicle to test the extent of the unity and cohesion within the world 
communist movement and between the PCF and CPSU. The extent of the 
change in relations, howe~er, was not clear. 
The condemnation of the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by the PCF in August of 1968, after years of loyal compliance with CPSU 
policies, was a turning point in the history of the French Communist 
Party. However, scholarly writings concerning the PCF position have 
been ambiguous due to the wide variety of attitudes, opinions, and ap-
praisals of the meaning of the French action. Annie Kriegel offered 
only a vague inference that there was a "change" toward a more inde-
pendent posture in PCF policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in her book, 
Th.e French Communists. 1 The compilers of The Yearbook on International 
Communist Affairs, 1969, stated that the PCF showed only passing inter-
est in Czechoslovakia during the first half of 1968 and that ''It was 
not until the middle of July that the PCF involved itself to any great 
degree with developments in Czechoslovakia. 112 
In Leaders of the Communist World, Pierre Delain contributed an 
article on Waldeck Rochet, the secretary-general of the French Communist 
Party, in which he determined that the PCF reaction was "written by the 
Soviet leaders at the same time of the marching orders of the [Warsaw 
3 Pact] army." In contrast Kevin Devlin expressed the view, in Problems 
of Communism, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia provided an "apparent-
ly enduring conflict of political interests" between the communist move-
ments in Western Europe and the Warsaw Pact. 4 Devlin argued that the 
PCF approved of and applauded the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. 
Ronald Tiersky wrote an analysis of the events of 1968 in his work, 
French Communism, 1920-1972, at a later date, and even he stated: 
••• the French Communist leadership has demonstrated 
a refusal to make any irretrievable commitment on the 
issue of the relations between the 'fraternal' parties 
and the CPSu.5 
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However, Tiersky later indicated that "the French Communists have final-
ly drawn the conclusion of over three decades of 'cooperation' in pur-
suing the Soviet interest."6 Thus it is evident that the interpreta-
tions available on the subject are both limited in scope and greatly 
varied. 
The unique historical allegiance of the PCF to the CPSU leader~ 
ship partially explains the diversity in interpretations of the French 
Communists' position in 1968. The themes of internationalism and con-
formity buttressed this communist movement from the beginning. Addi-
tionally, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the party of the 
first and most powerful Marxist state, historically had assumed the 
role of head of the global communist movement. However, after 1945, 
the national communist phenomenon emerged from within the ranks of the 
European communities. This philosophy was based on the premise that 
the communist experience was unique in each country due to the indi-
vidual history, background, and conditions pres~nt in each culture, 
and thus individualized forms of communism must develop. This form of 
revisionism created a paradox within the international movement. 
After the defeat of the fascist alliance in 1945, the CPSU faced 
a fragmentation of the so-called communist "monolith" and a new chal-
lenge to its position as the leader therein. However, from the years 
prior to World War II until the late 1960s, the official French 
4 
Communist Party policies followed closely the dictates enumerated by 
the Soviet Union. The PCF suffered the consequences of this adherence 
and conformity to the CPSU policy line. Membership in the party dropped 
sharply when the PCF endorsed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 
1939. 
The PCF did not always parrot the CPSU policy statements as closely 
as might be expected. When in 1956, in his "Secret Speech," Nikita 
Khrushchev denounced Joseph Stalin's "cult of personality," PCF/CPSU 
friendship became visibly strained for a time. Again in 1964 PCF and 
CPSU opinions diverged over the issue of the role of\religion "in a so-
. 1" . "7 Cl.a l.St SOCl.ety. These differences never seriously divided the two 
parties, and the PCF continued its basic policy of close adherence to 
CPSU leadership and authority. In 1964 the PCF a~cepted Khrushchev's 
position on Peaceful Coexistence with the capitalist states, and sup-
ported the authority of the CPSU when it was challenged by the Chinese 
Communist Party. When Khrushchev was deposed, the PCF (after a brief 
period of confusion within the ranks) welcomed the new Russian leaders, 
Leonid Brezhnev and Alexie Kosygin, to the Kremlin. Thus, the PCF's 
denunciation of Soviet activities in 1968 was most significant given 
the historical closeness exhibited the PCF and the CPSU. Therefore 
this reversal of French tactics deserves further examination and careful 
analysis. 
The best sources for examining the views, actions, and attitudes 
of these two communist parties in the Czechoslovakian affairs of 1968 
is a study of the reactions of each party as they were recorded in the 
official party newspapers. These policy outlets provided a means for 
revie~ing the recorded positions expounded by the respective parties. 
By articulating the ideological positions assumed by the parties' 
leadership, these journals established a chronological documentation 
of the interests, reactions, and attitudes of the parties. The papers 
informed the readers, communist and non-communist, of the official and 
specific policies of each party. In The French Communists, Annie 
Kriegel pointed out that 
Whenever there is an orthodoxy there is an official informa-
tion bulletin but not necessarily a newspaper in the real 
sense of the word. And L'Humanite is read, quoted, and dis-
cussed precisely as if it were an official information 
bulletin. 8 
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The use of the documentation of the official party journals provided an 
effective means with which to compare and contrast the specific party 
lines expressed by e·ach party and allows for an analysis of the chro-
nology of the subtle developments of the positio~s of each on a day-to-
day basis. 
There are limitations to the exclusive use of this methodology. 
The foremost rests in the narrow, biased perspectives present in the 
party newspapers. However, the use of supplementary information served 
to balance the perspective of the situations as they existed at the 
time and afforded a more accurate account and assessment of the PCF's 
response to the Czechoslovakian "thaw" and the CPSU's subsequent in-
vasion of that country. The papers supplied an essential element in 
the interpretation of the ideological dilemmas of 1968 from the per-
spectives of the actors concerning national communism and of the 
emergence of an independent PCF, which have not as yet received ap-
propriate scholarly examination. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Annie Kriegel, The French Communists: Profile of a People, tr. 
Elaine P. Halprin (Chicago, 1972), p. 364. 
2 The Hoover Institute, The Yearbook on International CommunistAf-
fairs (Stanford, 1969), p. 328. 
3Pierre Delain, "Waldeck Rochet, the Kremlin's Organization Man in 
Paris," in Robert Swearingen (ed.), Leaders of the Communist World (New 
York, 1971), p. 489. 
4Kevin Devlin, "The New Crisis in European Communism," Problems 
of Communism, Vol. XVII, No. 6 (November-December, 1968), p. 57. 
5 Ronald Tiersky, French Communism 1920-1972 (New York, 1974), p. 
292. 
7Francois Fejto, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of 
International Communism (Cambridge, Mass, 1967), p. 159. 
8Kriegel, The French Communists: Profile of a People, p. 26. 
6 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
The ancestry of French conununism was linked directly to the strong 
socialist tradition of France. The leaders of the main factions of 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century French socialism, Jules 
Guesde and Jean Jaures, were influenced greatly by the tenets of Marx-
ism.1 In 1905 the two main factions formed the French Socialist Party 
(Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere, the SFIO). Yet, strong 
as this legacy might have been, it was the success of Russian Bolshev-
ism and the creation of the "first socialist state" in Russia that 
fostered the appearance of French communism. The SFIO fragmented in 
1920, when at the Congress of Tours, a majority of the members chose 
to participate in the Third International. The Section Francaise de 
l'Internationale Conununiste, the SFIC, was born, and within a year be-
came known as the Parti Conununiste Francaise, PCF. 2 
The French conununist adherence to and membership in the Third In-
ternational (Comintern) was the most important factor in early rela-
tions between Bolshevik Russia and the fledgling French Communist Party. 
The congresses of the Conununist International coordinated the growing 
world conununist movement, and the Bolsheviks, directed by V. I. Lenin, 
directed the Comintern. 3 The participation of the French connnunists in 
the Comintern signified their acceptance of the Twenty-one Conditions 
required for membership in the Connnunist International. 4 The French 
7 
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communists, as well as other "parties applying for Comintern member-
ship," were enjoined "to expell 'revisionists,' 'opportunists,' 'lackeys 
of the bourgeosie,' and similar vague, unscientific categories."5 By 
1924 the French Communist Party expelled the "vague categories" from the 
PCF organization by removing the non-Bolshevized leadership. At the 
same time, the French connnunists' internal political structure was re-
organized along the "Leninist conception of democratic centralism."6 
Thus, the PCF was linked firmly with the party and doctrine of Lenin. 
Paying homage to the Comintern generally was recognized as a pre-
requisite for gaining aid from Bolshevik Russia which supplied the 
emerging communist parties with finances and information. However, 
this aid was not without a price. In France: 
The reorganization of the party, the expansion of its ap-
paratus, and the development of new cadres required money; 
and the leadership's need for money, which it had no means 
of raising, made it [the PCF] more dependent than ever upon 
Moscow.7 
Consequently the early French communists owed not only their ideology 
and political structure to the Russian communists, but also their fi-
nancial existence. 
The las~ half of the 1920s proved to be a confusing time for the 
PCF. The French Communist Party was confronted with problems of re-
organizing the party framework, declining membership, and financing the 
party structure. These difficulties were compounded furtper by the in-
ternal chaos in Moscow due to the struggle for leadership between 
Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky. Stalin emerged victorious in this 
clash for control of the Soviet Union and the CPSU. Once Stalin be-
came dominate he placed the Comintern on a new course which caused ad-
ditional problems for the French Communist Party. This course, 
/ 9 
orchestrated by the Comintern, changed the PCF from the "united front" 
tactics utilized in the early and mid 1920s to the "class against class" 
policies of Stalin in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
The "united front" strategy, begun in 1922, was an effort by the 
Comintern to solidify the other workers' parties with the growing com-
munist movement. For the new French Communist Party, the "united front" 
strategy also proved to be a point of confusion in its early develop-
ment. At this time of bolshevizing the party, the Comintern decreed a 
reconciliation with the non-communist faction of Tours. 8 Conflict con-
cerning the united front between the Comintern and the French communists 
resulted. By t.he first half of 1923, the French Communist Party re-
luctantly acquiesced to the International, but not without strained re-
lations within the party and toward the leadership of the Comintern. 9 
Stalin rejected the "united front'' strategy in 1928 and replaced 
it with the "class against class" doctrine. The new Comintern policy 
specifically discarded any cooperation with the non-communist left and 
asserted, as Tiersky stated, that "European working classes as a whole 
••• [should] • • • unite under the sole leadership of the communist 
parties. 1110 Tiersky concluded that this doctrine served only "to lead 
[the PCF] ever more completely into isolation from the French nation· 
and into contact with the international Bolshevik community centered 
il 
around the Soviet Communist Party." The "class against class" 
orthodoxy insulated the PCF from the mainstream of French politics. 
Although at times reluctantly, the PCF loyally adjusted to the fluctu-
ations in Comintern dogma and the policies of Stalin. 
The influence of the PCF in France diminished considerably by the 
early 1930s. The anti-socialist campaign, which began in the 1920s 
10 
effectively alienated all but the most dedicated followers of the 
12 French Communist Party. In this decade the PCF's philosophical 
stance was altered at least three times. The early doctrine of revolu-
tion was exchanged quickly for adherence to the tenets of the united 
front, and then once again revamped to accommodate Stalin's "class 
against class" doctrine. It was during this time and the early 1930s 
that Maurice Thorez became the leader of the PCF. 
Thorez rose through the local party structure and reached the 
level of a Politbureau member of the PCF in less than ten years. His 
success has been attributed to his unwavering commitment and loyalty 
to the Soviet Union. He followed the dictates of Stalin and the Comin-
tern religiously. He always pleased the CPSU-controlled International, 
while many of his contemporaries and rivals in the PCF challenged the 
role of the Comintern in coordinating world communism. At a time when 
the new communist parties were so dependent on the Soviet Union and its 
communist party, strict fidelity to the Comintern was an important 
element in one's rise to power. Even during the chaos in Moscow con-
cerning Stalin's and Trotsky's struggle for power, Thorez avoided a 
dangerous situation by complying with the dictates of the Comintern, 
h . . . 13 w atever 1ts ·pos1t1on. Later, this policy led Thorez to side against 
Trotsky and Trotsky's supporters in the PCF, primarily Boris Souvarine, 
a prominent member of the PCF Politbureau. 14 In 1934 Thorez, sanctioned 
by Moscow, adopted the new strategy of the Popular Front hence eliminat-
ing Jacques Doriot, Thorez's most serious rival for leadership. 15 Al-
though initially opposed to the idea of the Popular Front, Thorez 
changed his position, paid homage to Moscow, reversed the policy of 
11 
"class against class," and replaced the old policy with a new coopera-
tive effort with the socialists in France. 
The Popular Front was a joining of the Communist and Socialist 
Parties in France for a "defensive coalition, formed spontaneously 
after February 6, 1934, by a sort of survival instinct for the defense 
f d . . . 1 1116 o emocrat1c pr1nc1p es. This defense was needed to oppose the 
growing threat of Fascism in Europe. The revolutionary fervor of the 
"class against class" doctrine was now supplemented by a theme promot-
ing unified action of the Left, and this included the bourgeois as well 
as communist members. The Comintern formally sanctioned the Popular 
Front tactic in 1935. The Popular Front of the French Left succeeded 
in bringing the coalition to power in 1936. The PCF, as a member of 
this coalition, advocated a posture of national qefense that aided not 
only the interests of France but also the interests of the Soviet 
U . 17 n1on. 
The Soviets too were worried about the Fascist menace. However, 
the unification of the Left and the common interests of the Soviet 
Union and France was short-lived. The French Leftist government agreed 
to the "appeasement" of Adolph Hitler in the form of the Munich Pact of 
1938. To avoid war with Germany, the British and French governments 
sanctioned the German leader's demand during the Munich crisis for the 
German annexation of the Sudtenland of Czechoslovakia. This brought 
the dissolution of the Popular Front in France. It was viewed by the 
PCF (and, of course, by the Soviet Union) that this "appeasement" was 
an attempt "to make a sacrifice of the Soviet Union, rendering the 
Maxim 'Better Hitler than Stalin' the watchword of Western European 
foreign policy." 18 Subsequently, the PCF withdrew support from the 
12 
Popular Front government, criticized the Munich Pact, and initiated a 
stringent anti-Fascist platform as the Second World War drew closer. 
Between the dissolution of the Popular Front in 1938 and August of 
1939, the French Communists continued staunch opposition to Fascism. 
In August, however, with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression 
Pact, the PCF (and Thorez) were caught in a complicated situation. The 
Soviets, instead of being anti-German, now became~neutral toward the 
• 
Germans, a position the PCF reluctantly was required to embrace. Con-
sidering that Hitler was thus free to attack Western Europe (he did not 
then have to fear an attack from Russia on the east), the French govern-
ment declared the French Communist Party illegal. After this major 
shift in policy, the PCF became divided and confused. Some Party mem-
hers rejected the neutralist policy, others went underground to avoid 
19 
arrest, and still others (Thorez for one) left France. 
The disarray persisted until June of 1941 when the Germans turned 
on the "neutral" Soviet Union and invaded "Mother Russia." Once again 
Moscow made an about face as the communist world rallied to arms, in-
eluding the illegal PCF in German subjugated France, against the Fas-
cist German enemy. What once had been a war among "imperialist nations 
over world markets," which the Soviet Union was more than happy to 
avoid was now "a great patriotic war of freedom-loving peoples against 
Fascism. 1120 In the case of the PCF, "The German attack on the Soviet 
Union made it possible for members of the French Co~unist Party to be 
good Frenchmen as well as milit'ant Communists. 1121 The French Commu-
nists, now sanctioned by Stalin's revived anti-Fascism, became an in-
tegral part of the underground French Resistance, and as such, were 
13 
catapulted to the forefront of French political parties by the end of 
the war. 
During World War II the PCF supported the French Committee of Na-
tional Liberation, the anti-Vichy Free French governing body, and with 
the blessings of Stalin, agitated for a voice in the Free French govern-
22 
ment. The once outlawed PCF entered the Free French political system 
in 1943. In 1944 the PCF accepted ministerial posts in the French Com-
mitte. However, the PCF's acceptance of the Commissar of Air and the 
Commissar of State in the provisional French government resulted only 
after considerable debate with General Charles de Gaulle. 23 By the end 
of the Second World War the PCF secured and held a place in the post 
war reconstruction government of France, and was a major political force 
in French elections. 
The years from World War II until 1968 illustrated three successive 
periods of PCF development. 24 The first period, from the end of the war 
until 1947, was a time during which the PCF attained its greatest in-
fluence in the French government. The second period extended from 1947 
until 1962, when the French Communist Party, although still a major po-
litical organization in France, was excluded effectively from partici-
pation in any coalition government. Throughout this period the PCF had 
to deal with several major crises within the international movement. 
The last phase lasted from 1962 until early 1968, a period which em-
phasized the rejuvenation of the "unity of the Left" theme in French 
politics. During these years the PCF sustained its firm commitment to 
the pursuit of domestic goals within the confines of international 
orthodoxy dictated by the CPSU and the foreign policy of the Soviet 
Union. 
14 
The PCF emerged from World War II as a powerful force in French 
politics. Support for the Communists among the French people grew 
mainly from the Party's effective involvement in the Resistance move-
ment during the war. The years. of the war and those years immediately 
after comprised a period of cooperation among the "freedom-loving 
peoples" of the communist and capitalist ideologies. In this atmos-
phere the PCF was· able to adhere to the Soviet line and at the same 
time enjoy a period of growing national influence within France. The 
PCF participated in the French coalition government,* its members serv-
ing as ministers, and at times, garnering the largest vote count of the 
coalition in the popular elections. But this cooperation in France and 
in the world was an alliance of adversaries, one with little·future. 
In 1947 the French coalition government went through a series of 
international and domestic crises which ended with the PCF rejecting 
the coalition. The PCF clashed with the other factions of the govern-
ment concerning the fate of French Indo-China, where the French were 
fighting an armed national movement. The PCF demanded a negotiated 
settlement of the conflict. The other coalition members (as well as 
French popular opinion at the time), were motivated by nationalism, 
and refused to submit to negotiations on the grounds that this would be 
a blow to French prestige and national honor. Meanwhile, domestically 
the PCF began agitating for increased workers' wages (although this 
stand came only after considerable pressure and several wildcat strikes 
from the rank and file proletariat). 25 On this issue as in foreign 
*This coalition consisted of the PCF, SFIO, and MRP (Mouvement Re-
publican Populaire; the right of center party). 
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affairs the coalition government rejected the PCF position. After the 
wage-dispute episode, the PCF was forced to withdraw from the govern-
ment, thereby excluding the PCF members from the ministries and curbing 
their influence in the French decision-making structure. 
Just as influential on the PCF as the internal political disputes 
in France was the international crisis in the wartim.e alliance. By the 
summer of 1947 the leaders of the alliance, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, had split over issues of national interests and had dis-
solved what was left of the "freedom-loving peoples" alliance. The re-
sult was the Cold War, a conflict between the communist and non-
communist worlds. The development further alienated and isolated the 
PCF from the French domestic political structure as the "us versus 
them," or communist versus non-communist mental:iity prevailed in France 
as in the world at large. Throughout the nineteen-fifties and into the 
nineteen-sixties, this attitude greatly affected the position of the 
French Communists, as their national and international policies di-
verged significantly from those espoused by the other major parties. 
The PCF was not without troubles in other areas. The leadership 
of the Soviet Union, upset with the "encroachment" of American power 
in Western Europe (a by-product of the war), berated the French and 
Italian Communist Parties at the first Cominform* meeting for not doing 
more to prevent this "new imperialism." The unity of the Left position, 
once cultivated by the Soviets, was now reversed by Stalin and replaced 
*The Cominform was created in the late 1940s by the Soviet Union, most 
of the East European communist states, and the French and Italian Com-
munist Parties in an attempt to form an organization which would aid 
in the communication and promotion of a clear-cut and uniform communist 
doctrine. 
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with a hard-line anti-American posture designed to bring the major 
parties of Europe into line with the concept of monolithic unity. The 
Cominform, with the CPSU firmly in control, promoted this anti-
Americanism, and the PCF agreed. By 1947 the PCF, after a brief period 
of self-criticism for its inability to deal effectively with the chang-
ing times (that is, from the unity to the hard-line stance), was locked 
firmly into the current policy advocated by the Soviet camp. 26 The 
only real fault of the PCF was its failure to deal rapidly enough with 
Stalin's remarkable maneuvering in foreign policy. 
As a manifestation of the Cold War and the dissolution of the 
unity of the Left's policy, the non-communist parties in France ex-
eluded the PCF from participation in the government. The fifteen years 
between 1947 and 1962 have been characterized by one author as the 
period of "Le grand schisme. 1127 The exclusion was achieved, although 
the PCF continually garnered approximately one-quarter of the votes in 
h f h 1 1 . 28 eac o t e genera e ect1ons. Consequently, the PCF positions re-
lating to the domestic and foreign policies of France became largely 
b 1 . . 29 sym o 1c 1n nature. While the French Communist Party in these fifteen 
years was driven out of the French government, the party was confronted 
with rapi~ly changing developments in the international communist com-
munity as well. 
After World War II, the development of the national communist phe-
nomenon created something of a paradox and certainly produced a change 
within the international communist movement. The fundamental premise 
for national communism was that a nation or state, because of its 
unique history, background, or conditions, developed individual forms 
of communism in order to fit its special needs and problems. 
Consequently, this national posture resulted in conflicts within the 
ranks of the international forum between members loyal to the CPSU 
policy and those which deviated from this line in favor of either re-
visionist or centralist doctrines. 
17 
The earliest conflict was illustrated by a clash which began in 
1948 between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or, more specifically, 
between the leaders of the two countries, Josef Stalin of the Soviet 
Union, and Josef Broz Tito of Yugoslavia. This disagreement developed 
as a result of Stalin's apparent inability to accept the non-CPSU domi-
nated Tito and his communist party in Yugoslavia. The outcome of this 
clash was the eventual expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform and 
the subsequent condemnation of the Yugoslav party by a majority of the 
communist parties of the world. Furthermore, out of this conflict 
arose the principle of Titoism, an independent and individualistic form 
of communism. The initial crack in the international communist "mono-
lith" thus emerged. As a consequence, two distinct centers of ideology 
became apparent within the world communist movement. 
For the French Communist Party, however, there remained only one 
center of global communism, that which reigned in Moscow and which 
Stalin personified. Thorez and the PCF viciously condemned the Yugo-
slav party in general and Tito in particular. These denunciations con-
tinued for years after 1948 and, as Francois Fejto remarked, it was as 
if "the French Communist Party was like a province or republic of the 
Soviet Federation. 1131 Thorez was a devoted supporter of Stalin, and 
therefore the French Communist leader's rejection of Titoism came as 
no surprise. 
The challenge of Titoism was contained effectively by the Soviet 
18 
Union and the CPSU which thought Stalin maintained firm control of the 
direction in which world communism progressed. The impact of Stalin's 
personal leadership, both within the Soviet Union and over the entire 
communist world, became strikingly obvious after his death in 1953. 
The Soviet Union and the CPSU lost their authoritarian head-of-state, 
and the international movement lost its cohesive bond. To be sure, 
Stalinism without Stalin remained a powerful doctrine throughout the 
world, but without the man, Stalinism simply could not maintain its 
previous momentum. 
Three years after the death of Stalin, the Marxist states and 
parties throughout the world were thrown into a tumultuous uproar when 
Nikita S. Khrushchev gave his devastating "Secret Speech" in February 
of 1956. The speech, delivered at a closed sess~on of the Twentieth 
Party Congress of the Soviet Union, signaled an attack on the "cult of 
the individual."32 Stalin, the champion of socialism over the German 
Fascist menace, the great leader of the Soviet Union, the director of 
the Communist Party of the "first socialist state," and the undisputed 
head of the world Marxist order, was condemned by Khrushchev for de-
viation from the true Marxist-Leninist path. Proof, according to 
Khrushchev, was afforded by the emergence of the cult of the indi-
vidual, of which Stalin was the center. This cult, Khrushchev argued, 
"became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of 
exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, Party 
democracy, and revolutionary legality."33 Once Stalin's deviations 
from the "true path" were declared to be "perversions, 11 what followed 
throughout much of the communist world was an unleashing of the flood-
gates of diversity. 
t . 
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Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin created quite a turmoil within 
the PCF. To be sure, prior to the "Secret Speech" the PCF leadership, 
and more significantly Thorez, conflicted with the U.S.S.R.'s "collec-
... 34 
tive leadership." However, once the condemnation of the "cult of the 
individual" became publicly known, the staunch Stalinist Thorez relented 
in favor of allegiance to the CPSU. The French Communist Party, domi-
nated by Maurice Thorez, backed the CPSU position in subsequent disputes 
within international communism and reluctantly shifted its policies from 
the centralism of Stalin to the doctrines of Khrushchev. 
During the 1950s and the 1960s the disputes within world communism 
took many forms. As a direct response to Khrushchev's anti-Stalin 
speech, the Italian Communist Party (PC!) and its leader Palmiro Tog-
liatti promoted a more independent attitude vis-a-vis the CPSU. Tog-
liatti asserted that, "The whole system [international communism] be-
comes polycentric, and even in the communist movement we cannot speak 
of a single guide."35 This polycentrist position outwardly contrasted 
with the traditional approach of centralization with the CPSU serving 
as the "single guide" to the movement. Furthermore, the Italian com-
munists "supporting the Poles in resisting the idea being promoted by 
certain other parties • • • that a new organization along the lines of 
the Cominform was required to restore discipline and unity to the move-
36 
ment." Clearly, there appeared an increased preference among some 
communist parties for a more diversified international communist move-
ment. 
The Italian approach to global communism conflicted sharply with 
that of Thorez and the belief of the PCF that the CPSU should remain 
h .d f . 37 t e guJ. e or communJ.sm. The PCF and several other communist parties 
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condemned the polycentrist position as a "tendency toward factional-
ism."38 The French Communist Party's positions in relation to the 
negative interpretation of polycentrism linked the PCF once again 
closely to the tenets of the CPSU. Although Thorez was slow to embrace 
totally Khrushchev' s· divergences from Stalin, in no way was he prepared 
to accept the Italians' multiple decentralized form of communism. 
In the same year as the "Secret Speech" several socialist states 
in Eastern Europe, which had loyally followed the lead of Stalin, 
initiated significant steps toward national communism. Hungary and 
Poland both began to exercise new national policies which Stalin never 
would have sanctioned. In the case of Hungary, the national movement 
which seemed "to have won the endorsement of international communism" 
in the summer of 1956, soon was squelched when, on October 31, Imre 
Nagy's government publicly rejected the "allegiance to the Soviet 
39 
camp." This decision to break openly with Moscow and to declare 
Hungary a neutral state, precipitated an invasion by the Soviet Union 
which brought the Hungarians back into conformity. Poland initiated a 
national posture directed by Wladyslav Gomulka which, although not par-
ticularly pleasing to the CPSU, was accepted nonetheless by the Kremlin. 
Poland remained within the Soviet hegemony, subservient to the dictates 
of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 
In both the cases of Hungary and Poland, the PCF reacted negative-
ly because of the party's Stalinist tradition and its devotion to the 
CPSU. The PCF supported the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet Union, 
equating the Nagy government with the heresies of "revisionism" and of 
. 1 . 40 nat1ona commun1sm. With the Poles the PCF leadership chose mostly 
to ignore the solution of Polish relations with the Soviet Union. 41 
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As long as Thorez lived, the PCF continued to maintain a Stalinist base 
temper~d by the new leadership in Moscow. Yet, Thorez carefully avoided 
any direct clash with Khrushchev in the strict tradition of fidelity 
with the CPSU. 
Although Thorez was reluctant to embrace de-Stalinization he main-
tained his dissatisfaction at a much lower level than did the Chinese. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Mao tse-Tung, adhered to the 
theme of Stalinist centralism and global uniformity in the tradition of 
Stalin. The CCP disagreed ideologically with Khrushchev and the CPSU 
concerning the policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, and re-
jected the condemnation of Stalin. And, most important, the CCP re-
jected the theory of a "peaceful transition of socialism." This theme, 
supported by many Communist parties both in and outside the governments 
of respective nations, rejected the axiom that only violent revolution 
could place a communist party in power in a state. The idea of "peace-
ful transition" was received well in the communist parties of Italy and 
France, where it legitimized those parties' methods for vying for power 
through the established system of representative democracy in the 
bourgeois states. The CCP leadership believed that the policy negated 
the revolutionary concepts which formed an inherent part of the basic 
principles of Marxism and communism~ The resulting schism between the 
two most powerful communist states forced the most serious break in 
h . i . 1 42 t e commun1st nternat1ona movement. Although the PCF was intrigued 
at first by the centralist position of the CCP, by 1963 the lure of the 
theme of "peaceful coexistence" and the traditional loyalty to the CPSU 
43 proved stronger. 
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Throughout the first eight years of the 1960s the communist parties 
of the world basically considered the problems created by de-
Stalinization. The Sino-Soviet split became more intense during this 
/ time, and rose to the level of sporadic border clashes between the two 
states. In addition, the "resignation" of Khrushchev in 1964 further 
complicated the international communist situation. Although Moscow's 
influence waned within the world communist structure, the leadership of 
the Soviet Union attempted to maintain its position of leadership within 
the Marxist world. This held true particularly in the states adjacent 
to the borders of the Soviet Union, other than Communist China. Thorez, 
until his death in 1964, maintained obedience to the CPSU line, regard-
less of the changes within leadership in the Kremlin. Waldeck Rochet 
succeeded Thorez as head of the PCF and, as Pierr~ Delain stated, Rochet 
was "the Kremlin's organization man in Paris."44 
The PCF continued to side with the CPSU on every major issue of 
international communism. The French communists condemned Titoism and 
rejected Italian polycentrism; they sanctioned the invasion of Hungary 
by the Soviet Union and were outspoken critics of Chinese centralism. 
The PCF approved of Khrushchev's doctrines of "peaceful coexistence" 
d I f 1 • • • 1 • 1145 an 'peace u trans1t1on to soc1a 1sm. The theme of close coopera-
tion, fi~ed loyalty, and commitment to the policies of the CPSU often 
was reaffirmed. Even Khrushchev's resignation, which brought in Leonid 
Brezhnev, ca~sed no major reevaluation of PCF policy. Domesticly, ''the 
unity .of the Left" was reinstated in 1964 as the position of the PCF 
and confirmed by the Kremlin. 46 By 1966 the French and Italian com-
munists reconciled seemingly with the "blessings" of the Kremlin. 47 
This close cooperation with the Soviet Union remained an integral part 
of PCF ideology until alternations occurred in 1968. 
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The policies of the PCF and CPSU during the years traditionally 
were coordinated. With this background from 1920 until 1968, the de-
nunciation of the actions of the Soviet Union and four countries of the 
Warsaw Pact by the PCF in 1968, illustrated a substantial change in PCF 
attitudes. Consequently, the evolution of this change toward a more 
independent French Communist Party vis-a-vis the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union centered upon the PCF attitudes toward the events which oc-
curred in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The position of the French Communist 
Party throughout this year was illustrated clearly in L'Humanite. This 
newspaper published official reports and commentaries daily. L'Humanite 
delineated the positions taken by the leadership of the PCF in favor of 
the reforms and the liberalization of the government of Czechoslovakia 
as they were introduced by Alexander Dubcek, and bf his eventual plight. 
' 
The tone of the articles in L'Humanite contrasted sharply with the 
articles and official statements offered by the CPSU as they were pre-
sented in Pravda. Thus, divergencies can be discerned from the official 
bulletins of each party. The contrasting tones of the accounts of these 
journals of the affairs in Czechoslovakia in 1968 indicated conclusively 
that the PCF rejection of the hegemony of the CPSU was associated di-
rectly with the Czechoslovak issue. 
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CHAPTER III 
REACTIONS TO THE REFORMS 
The response to the events in Czechoslovakia during the first eight 
months of 1968 illuminated the growth of PCF independence vis-a-vis the 
CPSU. Alexander Dubcek, who replaced Antonin Novotny as First Secretary 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) in January, 1968, initi~ 
ated a program of liberalization and democratization of the Czechoslo-
vakian party, government, and society. 1· Throughout the spring and early 
summer Dubcek's policies were debated among the communist parties of the 
world. The French communists were informed of the developments in 
Czechoslovakia and the French party's reactions to Dubcek's programs in 
articles, reports, and stories printed in L'Humanite. As L'Humanite's 
articles reflected one point of view on the CPC reforms, Pravda's arti-
cles reflected a different attitude. 
Alexander Dubcek initiated his first political and social reforms 
in January and February, 1968. However, the extent of these reforms: 
the abolition of censorship of the press, the alteration in the CPC 
leadership, and other reorganizations was not fully recognized by out-
side observers until March or later. The press, both of the PCF and 
CPSU gave similar accounts of the election of Dubcek to the position 
of First Secretary and to the addition of Jan Piller, Jozef Spacek, 
2 Emil Rigo, and Jozef Boruvka to the Central Committee. Both news-
papers printed short biographical sketches of Dubcek and commented 
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briefly on Novotny's resignation. Interestingly, the Pravda article 
lauded Novotny for his efforts in the "important successes achieved by 
the Party" during his years as First Secretary. 3 However, the French 
newspaper reporter in Prague, Phillippa Hentges, emphasized the more 
general political and economic developments attributed to the Central 
Committee of the CPC. 4 After the election of Dubcek, both Pravda and 
L'Hurnanite reported only sparingly on Czechoslovakia events until the 
end of February. At that time the Czechoslovakians commemorated the 
twentieth anniversary of the communists' ascension in power there in 
1948. 
During the last week of February several articles appeared in 
Pravda in conjunction with the twentieth anniversary of open communist 
rule in Czechoslovakia. Pravda published a speecp by First Secretary 
Dubcek which stressed the "solidarity" and the traditional friendship 
between the people of Czechoslovakia and the people of the Soviet 
Union. 5 Similar items appeared in Pravda, including a speech by Leonid 
Brezhnev in which he concentrated on the theme of close friendship and 
mutual respect between the two communist neighbors. 6 The French Corn-
rnunist Party also observed the Czechoslovakian anniversary. L'Hurnanite 
reported on the celebration in Prague in accounts printed on the 23rd 
7 
and 24th of February. The articles in L'Hurnanite basically were news 
stories of the commemoration of the birth of the Czechoslovakian corn~ 
rnunist state. In addition to the news reports, L'Hurnanite also pub-
lished a short address to First Secretary Dubcek from Waldeck Rochet, 
the General Secretary of the French Communist Party. In this release 
Rochet expressed hope that the CPC and the PCF would continue to have 
"new success in our activities in the service of socialisrn."8 In both 
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of the dailies, L'Hurnanite and Pravda, the unity of the communist world 
movements persisted as the general theme in the articles dealing with 
the Czechoslovakian celebration. 
A preparatory meeting of the international conference of the Corn-
rnunist and Workers' Parties, held in Budapest, Hungary, also received 
coverage in Pravda. One item in the paper focused on the ideas of 
unity, solidarity, and coordination within the international communist 
9 
movement. This Pravda article underscored the proposition that "Recog-
nition of the independence of parties is an ab~olute principle in our 
10 
movement." On February 29 an account of a speech delivered by M. A. 
Suslov, the head of the CPSU delegation at the consultative meeting in 
Budapest, was printed in Pravda. The text of Suslov's oration ernpha-
sized the CPSU's position on the independence of and fraternity among 
the various world communist parties. However, Suslov also warned that 
"dangerous nationalist tendencies have come to light in individual links 
of the Communist rnovernent."ll While this was not a direct reference to 
any particular party, Suslov's message served to illustrate the emerging 
concern that Soviet officials had for overtly independent courses of 
socialism within the world movement. 
Throughout March of 1968 the government of Czechoslovakia embarked 
on a course of action that was decidedly different from that which had 
been implemented under Novotny. By early April, "only ten of the 
twenty-nine member's of the cabinet were held over from the old govern-
12 
rnent." However, the changes being made in Czechoslovakia went beyond 
the mere restructuring of the ruling leadership. At this point the 
press in Czechoslovakia began to experience considerably less censor-
ship, and many individuals who had been discredited during the Stalinist 
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period of the early 1950s were "rehabilitated. 1113 At all times, the 
Czechoslovakian leadership maintained the posture that the communist 
party proposed to direct the country into a new era of truly socialist 
democracy. As the events in Czechoslovakia developed in March, 
L'Humanite issued numerous accounts and interviews covering the develop-
ing situation in Prague. 
Phillippa Hentges, the correspondent for L'Humanite, offered 
several reports from Prague regarding the evolution of the party's new 
programs for social democracy. In the March 13 issue of L'Humanite, 
Hentges related the approval of the economic and political changes by 
the regional communist organizations, which the Central Committee had 
. t d 1' . h 14 sugges e ear 1er 1n t e year. In the next day's edition, an illus-
tration of the relaxing of the censotship of the press and the opening 
of free discussion in Czechoslovakia appeared in L'Humanite. This re-
port included discussion of an "open letter" written by students in 
Prague. These students called for the ridding of the society of "mu-
t 1 • h • . I 1115 ua m1strust among t e c1t1zens. They also demanded an end to 
"American aggression in Vietnam," and also voiced their approval of 
16 the direction taken by the party and by Secretary Dubcek. This 
article thus contributed an additional insight into the growing freedom 
from Czechoslovakian citizens to criticize party officials and govern-
ment actions. Professors, students, and others openly denounced the 
explanation provided by the Minister of the Interior, Josef Kudrna, 
concerning an altercation between students and police on October 31, 
. 17 1967, at Charles University in Strahov. On March 16 L'Humanite re-
ported that Minister Kudrna and Prosecutor General Jan Bartuska were 
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dismissed by President Novotny, partially as a result of the incident 
h . . 18 at t e un1vers1ty. 
In a half-page article, topped with the headlines, "The Evolution 
of the Events in Czechoslovakia," L'Humanite provided further indication 
of the relaxation of censorship within Czechoslovakia. 19 This article 
was based primarily on the comments made by Oldrich Cernick, a member 
. of the CPC presidium and the president of the Planning Committee. 
Cernick's remarks were first made public by the Czechoslovakian Com-
munist Party daily, Rude Pravo. In the news report, Cernick was quoted 
as saying: 
It is a question of widening the socialist democracy which 
is one stage more than the bourgeois democracy. In our 
society where the possibility of restoration of capitalism, 
by internal forces, is no longer existent, and where the 
base of social process is the bringing togetper of the 
classes and harmonization of the interests of the indi-
viduals and of the social groups, all these conditions are 
brought together for a full blooming of the socialist 
democracy.20 
Thus, L'Humanite, the official newspaper of the French Communist Party, 
afforded a platform for Czechoslovakian politicians to expound upon the 
changing policies of their new government. 
In the meantime, several domestic organizations appealed to the 
gQvernment to reinstate victims of the purges of the Stalinist period 
and other discredited Czechoslovaks, most of whom were former soliders 
and partisan fighters. The principal organization behind this movement 
was the Union of Anti-Fascist Fighters, which issued calls for the re-
21 habilitation of thousands of persons. L'Humanite published a column 
on March 16, along with other accounts of news from Czechoslovakia, on 
these "demands" for the reinstatement of the victims by Joseph Hrusek, 
the president of the Anti-Fascist organization. 22 Clearly, the 
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pressure for fur·ther changes in Czechoslovakia was evident in the re-
ports in the French paper. 
In the following days, L'Humanite published almost daily accounts 
from Prague. Conversely, from the first of March until the final days 
of that month, Pravda virtually ignored the developments in Czechoslo-
vakia. On March 23 Pravda did mention the resignation of Novotny from 
h . f f . th . d f h b 1 . 23 1s o 1ce as e pres1 ent o t e repu 1c. The news account was 
interesting, short, and factual; it was comparable in context to an 
"expose" on ball bearings exports from Czechoslovakia, which appeared 
24 in Pravda on March 19. In comparison L'Humanite printed preliminary 
report of the President's imminent dismissal. On March 19 L'Humanite 
published an account of the demand for the removal of Novotny by the 
25 
regional organizations of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. On 
March 23 the PCF press headlined Novotny's resignation on the "News of 
the World" page of the daily. 26 Clearly L'Humariite contributed a 
broader, more in-depth discussion of the Novotny incident than Pravda. 
In March, 1968, there was no premeditated divergence on the part 
of the PCF and its press from any position taken by the CPSU concerning 
Czechoslovakia. There simply was no stated position or doctrine on the 
developments in Czechoslovakia from either the leadership of the PCF or 
of the CPSU. The differences observed between the two official news 
organs reflected the differing reactions to the events affecting the 
participants. The official line of the Soviet Union illustrated a 
"wait and see" attitude, as emphasized by the paucity of commentary on 
the rapid changes in Czechoslovakia. The French communists, via their 
party daily, portrayed a greater interest in the developments in Cz.ech--
oslovakia continued to develop, the CPSU maintained a wary stance 
33 
.toward the democratic socialism espoused by Dubcek and his followers, 
and the French Communist Party continued to grant the new leadership in 
Czechoslovakia extensive press coverage. 
In the first real attempt to develop a position toward the chariges 
in Czechoslovakia, a special meeting was called for by the members of 
the Warsaw Pact. Only Romania did not send a delegation to this meet-
ing. The conference, held in Dresden, German Democratic Republic, was 
convened primarily due to the alarm that Brezhnev and other pact leaders 
had concerning the direction in which Dubcek intended to lead the Czech-
1 k . 27 os qva 1an state. In this case, both L'Humanite and Pravda recounted 
the "friendly atmosphere" in which the meeting was held and otherwise 
. . d . f . . . h D d · 28 ma1nta1ne a un1 orm1ty 1n report1ng on t e res en meet1ng. 
i Soon after the Dresden conference several non-communist analysts 
reported that the delegation from Czechoslovakia had received pressure 
from the other participants regarding the soon-to-be-announced program 
for restructuring the society, politics, and economy of Czechoslo~ 
k . 29 va 1a. Within days, Pravda denounced this "bourgeois propaganda," 
h "l L'H . 1 . d f h P d. · 1 lO w 1 e uman1te mere y repr1nte excerpts rom t e rav a art1c e. 
The coverage given by L'Humanite of the Dresden conference solely con-
sisted of the official "public communique" issued from the conference. 
The same day that the official text of the Dresden meeting was pub-
lished in L'Humanite, the PCF continued·printing reports written by 
correspondent Hentges on the developments in Prague and the additional 
"r·ehabilitations" of the "victims of the years, 1951 to 1954. 1131 
At the end of March the press of i:he French Communist Party ex-
panded its coverage of the transformation of Czechoslovakian society 
from the Novotny days to the Dubcek "spring." The editors of L'Humanite 
34 
assigned a second correspondent to cover the situation in Prague. 
Antoine Acquaviva by-lined several articles in L'Humanite which ex-
amined the developments orchestrated by Dubcek. In the March 27 issue 
of L'Humanite Acquaviva analyzed the complex problems which had faced 
the leadership of Czechoslovakia from the beginning of January until 
h . f h . 1 32 t e t1me o t e art1c e. The next day Acquaviva continued his news 
analysis in Czechoslovakia and commented on the conflicting opinions 
within the Central Committee of the CPC regarding Dubcek's efforts to 
33 promote greater democracy. The special articles by Acquaviva quite 
correctly suggested that the crystalizing situation in the state was 
complicated not only from internal forces, but also from concerned ex-
ternal forces, the most important of which was the Soviet Union. 
In the final days of March, two additional noteworthy developments 
occurred concerning Czechoslovakia. General Ludvik Svoboda was elected 
president of Czechoslovakia, replacing the ousted Novotny. This dis-
tinguished general was a victim of the Stalinist period, but was "among 
34 
the first to be rehabilitated" in the early 1960s. Also late in 
March an ideological attack upon the CPC reforms was written by a GDR 
ideologue, Kurt Hager. Officials of the Czechoslovakian state pro-
tested this attack from Prague and from Berlin. L'Humanite published 
a short three paragraphs in reference to this subject on March 28, 
35 
while Pravda passed over the incident altogether. 
Decisions concerning the future of Czechoslovakia begun in Janu-
ary, molded in March, were made public policy in April. After lengthy 
debate and discussion, the Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian 
Communist Party endorsed Dubcek's Action Program on April 5. The Ac-
tion Program was the culmination of the Dubcek-inspired reforms. This 
35 
platform outlined a comprehensive model for enhanced freedoms and rights 
which were to be ensured by law. The Action Program further detailed 
the continued rehabilitation of former purge victims and also set up 
the framework for a new national construction. The communist party was 
to remain the vanguard of the people, and there was no mention of the 
possible legality of forming opposition parties. The Program also was 
designed to produce a foreign policy which allowed for "peaceful co-
existence" with the non-communist countries of Western Europe and North 
America. The Action Program was a far-reaching document which had sup-
porters and detractors both within and without the Czechoslovakian 
state. However, for the next several months, Dubcek's "socialism with 
a human face" would be the foundation on which the formulators of re-
form in Prague would base their polfcies. 36 
The passage of the Action Program by the Central Committee of the 
CPC was recorded extensively in L'Humanite. The French communist daily 
reported much of the actual debate within the Central Committee over 
the program as it continued from the first discussions in late March 
until the document was made public in early April. On April 2, in a 
joint report made by both of the correspondents for L'Humanite in 
Czechoslovakia, the French paper outlined the main points of the pro-
gram Dubcek wished to initiate. Included in the account were point-by-
point descriptions of the various clauses included in the Action Pro-
gram. Among these were: "liberty of expression," "equality of the 
Czechs and the Slovaks, further "rehabilitations," reorganization of 
the ministerial structure of the government, and additional reforms. 37 
On April 3 L'Humanite reported additional changes in the government of 
Czechoslovakia, recounting the resignation of presidium members Jiri 
36 
Hendryett and Vladimir Koucky. In the same article, once again, of-
ficials in Prague were quoted as reaffirming the quest of the CPC as 
"not to return to bourgeois parliamentarianism," but as an attempt to 
enhance socialist democracy within their country. And, still again in 
the same article, Jiri Hajek was reported to have reconfirmed the 
government of Czechoslovakia's commitment to the Soviet Union and to 
the Warsaw Pact. Hajek also stressed the desire for a greater role for 
Czechoslovakia within other multinational organizations such as the 
U . d N • 39 n1te at1ons. Nearly every day until the Action Program was made 
public on April 10, and announced in L'Humanite on April 11, the PCF 
press published commentaries on Czechoslovakia. 
On April 11 L'Humanite printed a brief outline of the actual Ac-
: 
tion Program and in the same issue devoted almost the entire page of 
the "News of the World" section of the paper to the Czechoslovakian 
events. 40 This section included an interview with Alexander Dubcek. 
Dubcek was questioned about the role of the CPC within the new program 
and also was questioned about "the place of other parties and organiza-
tions of the National Front. 1141 Dubcek's responses to these queries 
were significant; he emphasized the CPC would be in a leadership po-
sition, but would accept advice from the various other organizations 
42 involved in the National Front. Reports and interviews in L'Humanite 
thus stressed the importance of the Action Program and by mid-April had 
directly emphasized the new Czechoslovakian policies to its readers. 
The editors of Pravda waited until April 17 to publish any substan-
tial account of the Action Program. In a lengthy article which men-
tioned the "Soviet Army's heroic struggle" to liberate Czechoslovakia 
from the German Fascists, Pravda passed over much of the most evident 
37 
changes made by the government of Czechoslovakia. 43 During there-
mainder of April, the information contained in Pravda concerning the 
events in Czechoslovakia proved infrequent and largely uninformative. 
The CPSU apparently chose to ignore the developments in Prague, perhaps 
to allow time for decisions to be made in the Kremlin, and surely to 
veil consternation of the CPSU leadership over the Action Program re-
forms. 
Besides the Action Program, other significant events occurred in 
Czechoslovakia in April. One incident in particular was spurred by the 
increased freedom of the press of Czechoslovakia. Several newspapers 
in Czechoslovakia printed exposes of the purges conducted in that state 
during the early 1950s. A few of the reports went so far as to impli-
ff . . 1 f h s . u . . h b . f . . 44 cate o 1c1a s o t e ov1et n1on 1n t ese a rogat1ons o JUSt1ce. 
In subsequent reports in the Czechoslovakian press, the question of the 
"suicide" of Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister during the pre-communist era 
and son of the revered T. G. Masaryk, was reexamined. As it had been 
explained in an earlier time, Masaryk jumped to his death 'in Prague in 
March of 1948. Certain articles in the CPC newspaper in 1968 suggested 
that agents of the CPSU secret police official, Lavrentia Beria, were 
involved in the incident. 45 Rude Pravo published a request to the So-
viet Union for help in answering the questions surrounding the death 
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of Masaryk. L'Humanite printed two short articles covering the probe 
into Masaryk's death in Czechoslovakia, but avoided any comment. 47 
Pravda ignored the issue altogether until a month had passed, and, at 
that time, the press of the Soviet Union printed direct attacks on the 
Czechoslovakian press. 
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The events in Czechoslovakia were referred to in a speech given by 
Secretary General Waldeck Rochet at the plenary session of the Central 
Committee of the PCF of April 19. Rochet's report was given widespread 
and detailed publication not only in L'Humanite, but also in Le Monde 
d h F h . . 48 an ot er rene news organ1zat1ons. This speech was a far-reaching 
address which included domestic and foreign topics of importance to the 
French Communist Party. On the subject of the changes occurring in 
Czechoslovakia, Rochet pointed out that the "new situation" in Prague 
had revived "irresponsible elements" which did not share Dubcek's 
vision for Czechoslovakian socialism. 49 However, Rochet concluded his 
remarks by saying: 
We wish for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, for their 
Central Committee, and for their first secretary, Comrade 
Dubcek, for the government of the Socialist ;Republic of 
Czechoslovakia great success in the application of their 
program of aspiring to the blooming of socialism.50 
Rochet's speech was in microcosm the position adopted by the PCF 
in April. Rochet guarded this commitment by the PCF by denouncing any 
"anti-socialist" developments in Czechoslovakia, while offering obvious 
approval of Dubcek's government and Action Program at the same time. 
In the first four months of 1968, Alexander Dubcek succeeded in 
implementing his radically new governmental programs. The Action Pro-
gram, as the culmination of events in Prague, provided the Czec·hoslo-
vakian people with the foundation for one of the most open and progres-
sive states in Eastern Europe. The party newspapers both of the PCF 
and the CPSU published accounts of the developments and events in Czech-
oslovakia and in their functions as official party mouthpieces, por-
trayed their respective parties' attitudes toward and interests in the 
"Prague Spring." In depth and in volume of coverage, the French 
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Communist Party paper printed far more information regarding the de-
velopments in Czechoslovakia than did the CPSU's official press. Pravda 
restricted its public commentary and reported sparingly on the reforms 
instituted by Dubcek's government. L'Humanite publicized extensive ac-
counts, included in-depth interviews, and increased coverage at critical 
moments and, with Rochet's speech in April, afforded guarded support to 
the Dubcek reform movement. It was significant for the French commu-
nists that they were so well informed of the situation in Prague. In 
April the PCF and Rochet were not at odds with the CPSU, however, the 
foundation for conflicting policy positions on the Czechoslovak reforms 
were laid during the early months of 1968. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SUMMER AND WINTER 
The implementation of the Action Program of Czechoslovakia 
created difficulties between the CPC and the CPSU a~ the beginning of 
May. The censor-free press, promised in the Action Program of Czech-
oslovakia, enhanced the tensions between the press of Czechoslovakia 
the press of the Soviet Union. The questions asked in the CPC press 
in April concerning Jan Masaryk's "suicide" prompted, as earlier men-
tioned, an adament denial in Pravda. This incide1nt marked only the be-
ginning of the long and sometimes vehement conflict between the two 
presses which extended to cover the issues of ideology, foreign re-
lations and politics. In conjunction with the Masaryk case and others, 
the Soviet press also began to assail "some western press organs" for 
attempting to drive a wedge between the fraternally-bonded Sovie·t 
Union and Czechoslovakia. 1 The silence of the official newspaper of 
the CPSU and the other publications of the Soviet Union suddenly ended 
in the beginning of May, 1968. 
The reinvestigation into the death of Jan Masaryk received press 
coverage in Pravda nearly one month after the CPC paper, Rude Prav6, 
published the first article on the subject. On May 8, 1968, TASS, the 
official news agency of the Soviet Union, presented an article printed 
in Pravda which denied any involvement by agents of the Soviet Union in 
the death of Masaryk. The report further claimed "enemies of socialist 
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Czechoslovakia obviously hope to stir up anti-Soviet sentiments among 
politically unstable people. 112 Six days later, in an article in Sovet-
skaya Rossia, the daily publication of the Central Committee's Bureau 
for the Russian Republic and Government, M. Shirymov printed a "review" 
of several accounts of the role played by T. G. Masaryk, father of Jan 
and former president of Czechoslovakia, in the waning years of World 
War I and the interwar period in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
In his review Shirymov ridiculed the prominent patriot, revered by many 
Czechoslovakians. Shirymov ended his critique with a veiled attack on 
3 the CPC press. On May 17 Rude Pravo responded to the Shirymov article 
with a vehement denunciation. By the end of May the two "fraternal" 
parties' official newspapers waged an undeclared journalistic war. 
During this time, the Soviet press also unleashed written attacks 
on some unidentified western newspapers which reported on the strained 
relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. In some in-
stances the CPSU journalistic attacks on the American and Western Euro-
pean newspapers appeared in the same articles in which it denounced 
"hostile propaganda" from "individual Czechoslovak newspapers."4 On 
May 1 Pravda dicounted the United Press International release recently 
printed in the New York Times which stated the Soviet Union placed 
pressure on the government of Czechoslovakia, and concluded the purpose 
of the U. P. I. and the Times' report was to undermine the fraternal 
relations of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the So-
viet Union and Czechoslovakia. 5 Izvestia, the daily paper of the 
government daily accused the press of the Federal Republic of Germany 
of ''organizing ideological and propaganda sabotage against Czechoslo-
vakia" by subverting "the cause of socialism in Czechoslovakia."6 The 
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most complete attack on "The American Propaganda machine" occurred on 
May 24 in an article written by V. Kozyakov in the Krasnaya zvezda 
[Red Star], the daily published by the Ministry of Defense. 7 The 
author explained the "American political propaganda machine" was "under-
mining the construction of socialism in Czechoslovakia" and "Western 
specialists" were acting out of a desire to "tear Czechoslovakia away 
8 from the socialist commonwealth." 
An article in the Literaturnaya Gazeta provided an additional il-
lustration of the strained conditions between the presses of Czechoslov-
vakia and the Soviet Union. The Gazeta, the weekly of the Writers' 
Union of the Soviet Union, published a commentary on an interview 
granted by a member of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union to a reporter 
9 for the Agence France-Press. In the commentary,, printed on May 8, the 
Czechoslovak writer, Jan Prochazka, was assailed for his views on Marx-
ism, the role of the state, free press, and other issues on which he 
was accused of ideological "deviations." The article was thoroughly 
negative in its response to all positions outlined by Prochazka in the 
1 . . . 10 ear 1er 1nterv1ew. 
By May the reactions exhibited by the various Soviet newspapers 
and journals emerged after a prolong period of silence. These reac-
tions reflected the growing negative attitude toward the new changes in 
Czechoslovakia. In addition, the official news agencies of the Soviet 
Union interpreted the developing interest of the United States and 
Western Europe in the events in Czechoslovakia as a definite threat to 
their country's interests. 
L'Humanite mentioned little of the growing conflict regarding the 
friction between the presses of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. 
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On May 8, as a part of a larger article on Czechoslovakian "solidarity 
with the Soviet Union," the newspaper reprinted the TASS release cover-
11 ing Masaryk's death. However, the contents of the paper clearly were 
devoid of any commentary on the strife between the two "fraternal par-
ties" during the rest of May. During this month L'Humanite decreased 
coverage of specific events in Czechoslovakia. The largest item con-
cerning news from Czechoslovakia was published on May 6. This report, 
written by correspondent Acquaviva, covered an entire page in the French 
newspaper, and consisted of on-the-street interviews with Czechoslova-
kian citizens. Acquaviva concluded his report with his personal assess-
ment of the situation in Prague. Acquaviva utilized a question-and-
answer format, asking questions such as: "What is the failure of 
socialism?" He proceeded from this question to illustrate the lack of 
failure of socialism in Czechoslovakia. 12 In addition, Acquaviva in-
quired of some students, "What do you mean by liberty?" The answer 
13 given by the students focused on their desire "to know." Acquaviva 
explained that the students wanted to know about the "outside world," 
and about "our own world." Acquaviva continued with the explanation 
that the students "also wanted to know how and why the options are de-
termined of our politics, our economy, and our culture, to know and to 
participate."14 This L'Humanite article provided the most in-depth 
analysis of the changes in Czechoslovakia published in France to that 
time. The Acquaviva article went beyond the news releases and the of-
ficial statements of the Czechoslovakian leadership and brought to the 
readers a detailed account of the situation in Czechoslovakia. How-
ever, after this article, the news from Czechoslovakia was limited to 
occasional articles in L'Humanite, most of which emphasized the 
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"solidarity" between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. These arti-
~ cles included a number of excerpts from speeches made by the officials 
in Prague. 
Although solidarity and friendship between the CPC and the CPSU 
was the theme of the official statements offered by the representatives 
of both parties, this simply was a facade. 15 Throughout June and into 
July the animosities between the two were exacerbated by frequent snip-
ing exchanged by the news media of the two communist parties. The 
harshest attack occurred on June 14 in an article written by the ''aca-
demician" F. Konstatinov. 16 Konstatinov denounced the CPC Central Corn-
rnittee member Cestrnir Cisar for his "attempts to present different, 
L . . . . f M . "17 non- en1n1st 1nterpretat1ons o arx1srn. The attack by Konstatinov 
and the subsequent rebuttal by Cisar served as indications of the 
further deterioration of the relations between the ideologists and 
newspersons of these states. Interestingly, L'Hurnanite ignored these 
altercations, and for the most part, issued few reports on news from 
Czechoslovakia at this time. 
From the last days of June until the eventual invasion of Czech-
oslovakia in August, the situation between the CPC and the CPSU con-
tinued to deteriorate. Late in June the "Two Thousand Words," written 
by the author, Ludvik Vaculik, and signed by seventy Czechoslovakian 
citizens, was published. This document issued a· call for further 
liberalization within Czechoslovakia and for the removal of those 
government officials who opposed further reforrns. 18 The leaders of 
the Soviet Union were outraged at this "attack on the socialist founda-
tions of Czechoslovakia. 1119 Although Dubcek and the CPC leadership de-
nounced the "Two Thousand Words," the publication of this document led 
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the CPSU and Warsaw Pact officials to action. In the first week of 
July CPSU representatives met with the leaders of the communist par-
ties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic 
in Warsaw, Poland, to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia. Each of 
the delegates sent letters to the CPC to express unanimous consterna-
tion of the five parties over the turn of events in Czechoslovakia. 
A second meeting was held in Warsaw on July 15. The representa-
tives of the Warsaw Pact (again meeting without a delegation from Ro-
mania) produced the most critical analysis of the developments in 
Czechoslovakia yet issued. The communique written during this summit 
was "in effect an ultimatum outlining the rationale for invasion." 20 
This document, published in Pravda on July 18, proposed: 
The forces of reaction, taking advantage of the weakening 
party leadership in the country and demagogically abusing 
the slogan of 'democratization,' unleashed a campaign 
against the C.C.P. and its honest and devoted cadres, with 
the clear intention of liquidating the party's guiding 
role, undermining the socialist system and pitting Czecho-
slovakia against the other socialist countries.21 
The relationship among Czechoslovakia and the other five "fraternal 
parties" had deteriorated to a level of crisis by this time. 
A reply from the Central Committee of the CPC to the "Warsaw 
Letter" claimed unanimous support for Dubcek and his government. The 
Committee also stressed its "allegiance and friendship with the 
U.S.S.R." Although the Central Committee conceded at this time that 
certain "internal disputes" had arisen, it also reaffirmed its com-
22 
mitment to the principles embodied in the Action Program. In an 
editorial the attitude of the "Warsaw Letter" was reiterated and fur-
ther testimonial was given concerning the fear of "rightest, anti-
socialist forces in Czechoslovakia," which would strive to eliminate 
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"the Communist Party's guiding role in society." 23 At this time the 
Soviet leadership proposed a meeting in Russia between officials from 
Czechoslovakia and the Politburo of the Soviet Union. Dubcek and the 
Presidium of the CPC consented to a meeting, but proposed that talks be 
held in Czechoslovakia, at the border town of Cierna-nad-Tisou. 
For a month prior to the issuance of the "Warsaw Letter" the PCF 
and L'Humanite maintained a noticeably reserved position toward the 
growing antagonism between the CPC and the Warsaw Pact members. On 
occasion short news items were published in L'Humanite, but the interest 
once prominently displayed in the pages of the PCF paper concerning 
Czechoslovak reforms was no longer apparent. In July, as the rhetorical 
conflict grew heated, the French Communist Party increased its press 
coverage and its direct involvement in the matters between the CPC and 
the other Warsaw Pact states. L'Humanite reported on the response of 
CPC Central Committee pertaining to·the "Warsaw Letter" and, once again, 
printed in an adjoining article reaffirmation by the CPC of its commit-
ment to the ideals of communism. 24 
Two days earlier, on July 15, L'Humanite quoted an opinion survey 
taken by a Prague newspaper, Vecerni Praha, which stated 87% of the 
persons questioned were ''satisfied with the present government," and 
that the politician who "instills the most confidence" was Alexander 
25 Dubcek. On July 15 L'Humanite reported Rochet was enroute to Moscow 
to consult with representatives of the CPSu. 26 Following this trip, 
Rochet proposed a meeting of European Communist and Workers' Parties 
to discuss the situation in Prague. On July 20 L'Humanite announced 
Rochet had traveled to Prague and had met with the party leadership 
of CPC. 27 Rochet abandoned the idea of a European conference after 
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returning from Czechoslovakia. Upon his returning from Czechoslovakia, 
L'Humanite interviewed Rochet concerning his meetings with the Czecho-
slovak leadership. Rochet was quoted as stating in rather non-descript 
terminology, that his conversations with Dubcek and the other members 
of the leadership of Czechoslovak were conducted within the "framework 
. 28 
of socialist cooperation." However vague his statements, one fact 
remained: Waldeck Rochet, by virtue of his shuttling from Paris to 
Moscow, and to Prague, committed himself and the French Communist Party 
to a rectity of the conflict between Czechoslovakia and the rest of the 
Warsaw Pact countries. 
On the first page of the July 23 issue of L'Humanite the headlines 
heralded the meeting between the leadership of the CPC and the CPSu. 29 
The conference provided a forum for discussion of and negotiation for a 
solution to the CPC-CPSU conflict. The next day L'Humanite printed an 
interview of Waldeck Rochet written by Radio Luxembourg. The article 
included Rochet's expressions of "very great satisfaction" with the 
announcement of the summit meeting between the two Eastern European 
parties. 30 Rochet indicated he believed the problems could be resolved 
. . bl 31 1n an am1ca e manner. In regard to his visits to Prague and Moscow, 
the Secretary-General further stated he expressed to the leaders of the 
CPC and the CPSU "the hope of the French Communist Party to see the ex-
isting difficulties overcome between the fraternal parties by negotia-
tion, in respect of the national sovereignty of every country and in a 
1 . f 1 . . . 1. 1132 sp 1t o pro etar1an 1nternat1ona 1sm. Thus, the PCF became firmly 
committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict. Rochet's efforts 
clearly illustrated the extent of the concern of the French Communist 
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Party for the tense situation between the Warsaw Pact countries and 
Czechoslovakia. 
The meeting at Cierna between the CPSU and CPC delegations was 
followed by another conference held in the first week of August in 
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. The second meeting included representatives 
from Bulgaria, the German .Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Poland, as 
well as from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. For the French Com-
munist Party these consultations offered hope for "negotiated solu-
tions • 11 L 'Humanitie reporters closely followed the events at these 
conferences. The PCF press published a TASS report which claimed the 
Cierna meetings were friendly ''exchanges of points of view and 
opinions."33 On August 2 an article printed in L'Humanite announced 
the accord of Cierna was "satisfacto~ry to Moscow," and that once again, 
the CPC leadership reaffirmed its solidarity with the CPSU. 34 The two 
parties also agreed to meet with the other concerned members of the 
Warsaw Pact (again excluding Romania). On August 2 the parties recon-
vened at Bratislava in a continued attempt to solve the conflict be-
tween the CPC and other parties. The French Communist Party followed 
this conference with increasing anticipation of a solution. 
Meanwhile, the CPSU press continued its attacks on Czechoslovakia 
and the CPC leadership up uhtil the Cierna talks. On July 27 Pravda 
printed a reproach of the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defense 
for printing an article in that office's official paper, the Obdana 
Lidu, concerning Radio Free Europe. The Pravda article charged the 
Obdana Lidu editors with "publicizing the hotbed of counterrevolution-
35 
ary propaganda." Other examples of anti-Czechoslovakian reporting 
in Pravda included a month-long campaign, beginning in late June, for 
52 
meetings in the Soviet Union held to ''denounce Czechoslovakia's anti-
party tendencies.rr36 The Cierna conference and the Bratislava meeting 
quieted the criticism of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union. On August 
5, in an editorial in Pravda, evidence indicated the conflict had been 
averted by the "friendly consultation" and the reaffirmation of Czecho-
1 k . 1 1 h . 1" 1 h 37 s ova 1an oya ty to t e soc1a 1st commonwea t • 
The PGF reaction to the Bratislava conference was predictably 
jubliant. On August 5 L'Humanite published the text of the "Declara-
tion of Bratislava."38 The document stressed the standard thesis of 
solidarity, friendship, and equality. On August 6 L'Humanite printed 
a front page declaration of the positive reception of the Bratislava 
accord by the Politbureau of the French Communist Party. In language 
similar to that of the Bratislava declaration, the PCF leaders empha-
' 
sized the importance of "national sovereign" and of the equality of all 
h . 39 t e part1es. L'Humanite also printed a front page editorial which 
enumerated the accomplishments made at Bratislava. The author, Yves 
Moreau, described the accord as an illustration of international co-
. . h" h . . 40 operat1on w1t 1n t e commun1s.t commun1ty. The editorial also com-
mented on the role played by the French Communist Party and by Waldeck 
41 Rochet in contributing to the initiation of the talks. 
Understandably, the PGF was satisfied with the solutions. The 
conferences provided what appeared to be a political settlement to the 
disagreements satisfactory to all parties concerned. Therefore, the 
PCF claimed at least partial responsibility as a catalyst for the ne-
gotiated solution. The agreement allowed the Czechoslovakian Communist 
Party to continue its reforms within the government, and at the same 
time, committed the Czechoslovaks to the principles enunciated in the 
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Warsaw Pact. The Bratislava communique was broad enough to allow for a 
variety of interpretations. Thus, in mid August, the accord recreated 
an aura of cooperation within the European communist community. As a 
communist party in a parliamentarian state, the PCF took pride in its 
efforts to bring about the negotiated agreement among the parties of 
the communist states. 
Although the PCF press did not comment on the resumed criticism of 
Czechoslovakia in Pravda and other newspapers in the Soviet Union, the 
leadership of the French Communist Party undoubtedly was concerned by 
these continued attacks. On August 14 the Literaturnaya Gazeta printed 
a condemnation of an article authored by J. Valka in the Prague weekly, 
Literarni Listy. Valka commented on the Bratislava talks in a rather 
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unfavorable tone. The Soviet journal's author attacked Valka's po-
sition on the conference, and then went on to accuse the Federal Re-
public of Germany (FRG) of driving a "wedge between the socialist 
countries." The journalist also berated Valka for inviting imperialist 
aggression. 44 On August 16 Pravda included an article which continued 
the theme of FRG intervention, and in addition, denounced the Western 
press for its coverage of the Cierna and Bratislava talks. 45 On August 
18 Pravda resumed the criticism of the alleged "anti-socialist forces" 
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active in Prague. Thus, the agreement worked out at the beginning of 
August apparently fell apart, or was never actually implemented. On 
August 21, 1968, the combined forces of the Soviet Union and four War-
saw Pact member states invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia. 
The Soviet Union made the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia, ac-
cording to Pravda, because: 
••• party and state leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist 
Republic have requested the Soviet Union and other allied 
states to give the fraternal Czechoslovak people immediate 
assistance including assistance with armed forces. The 
teason for this appeal is the threat posed to the socialist 
system existing in Czechoslovakia and to the constitution-
ally established state system by counterrevolutionary forces 
that have entered into collusion with external forces hostile 
to socialism.47 
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Pravda's version of the justification for the invasion was not received 
in Prague. On the contrary, although the Soviet Union executed the in-
vasion with military perfection, it suffered several political disasters 
from the outset. 
The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPC overrode its 
pro-Soviet members and proclaimed this "action [the invasion] to be 
contrary to the fundamental principles of relations among socialist 
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states." A further problem developed for the invading armies when 
I 
this proclamation was transmitted across the Czechoslovakian country-
.d 49 s1 e. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were faced with 
the dilemma of occupying a fellow socialist country of an invitation 
from Czechoslovakian leaders who refused to come forward after the in-
vading forces secured the country. Furthermore, the invaders were con-
fronted by a population which was instilled with national pride and 
which held a deep resentment of the occupation. Although the Warsaw 
Pact intervention went well enough from a military standpoint, politic-
ally the foundations of the marginal "solidarity" of the international 
communist movement collapsed under the tank treads in the streets of 
Prague. 
The reaction of the communist parties throughout the world to be 
intervention was as varied as their locations. The Latin American par-
ties, led by the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba, approved of the 
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. . b h s . u . 50 1ntervent1on y t e ov1et n1on. The Communist Party of China con-
demned both the actions of the "revisionist" U.S.S.R."and its allies 
and the "revisionist" government of Czechoslovakia for "collaborating 
. h u s . . 1. n 51 w1t •• 1mper1a 1sm. Most of the Western European parties de-
nounced the fnvasion as did the Communist parties of Romania and Yugo-
slavia. The Italian Communist party (PCI) published a communique in 
that party's official newspaper, L'Unita, which reiterated Italian sat-
isfaction with the Cierna and Bratislava agreements. 52 The PCI also 
stated the intervention was "unjustified" and expressed "strong dis-
sent" toward the intervention. Interestingly, the PCI added a reaf-
firmation of "its solidarity with the actions of renovation undertaken 
53 by the Czechoslovak Communist Party." The Italian communists not 
only believed the invasion to be wrong, but also viewed the reforms in 
Czechoslovakia as positive and correct moves. With the exception of 
five minor parties, all of the Wes,tern European communist parties 
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voiced disapproval of Moscow's actions. Most significant of the 
European parties to denounce the invasion was the French Communist 
Party, one of the largest communist parties in the world, and the tra-
ditional ally of th~ CPSU in all policy matters. 
L'Humanite devoted the entire front page of its August 22 issue to 
the invasion. The PCF, in bold headlines, "expressed its surprise and 
reprobation" at the actions taken by the five socialist countries 
toward Czechoslovakia. 55 L'Humanite also printed commentaries provided 
by the communist parties of Yugoslavia, Romania, Italy, Great Britain, 
Belgium, and Austria, all of which condemned the invasion. 56 The sen-
timents of the PCF were made clear. No space was given in the August 
22 issue of L'Humanite to the pro-intervention arguments. On August 23 
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the French newspaper published a proclamation concerning the events in 
Czechoslovakia which passed unanimously by the Central Committee of the 
PCF. In this lengthy communique the PCF recounted the developments in 
Czechoslovakia which occurred over the past months, and concluded with 
a reaffirmation of PCF position that "every communist party must de-
terrnine its own politics, its own forms of action, its own methods in 
the struggle toward independence."57 The document included a statement 
of the French Communist Party disapproving of the military intervention 
' 58 into Czechoslovakia." 
On page two, the August 23 issue of L'Hurnanite contained the Pravda 
explanation of the intervention, and printed the news reports from 
Prague on page three. L'Hurnanite reported four members of the Presidium 
of the CPC requested the Warsaw Pact intervention. These members iden-
tified as Drahornir Kolder, Vasil Bilak, Alois Indra, and Fratisek Bar-
b . k 59 1re • However, L'Hurnanite also printed reports that these men denied 
k . h 60 rna 1ng sue a request. Although the PCF's initial reaction to the 
military action in Czechoslovakia was negative, the French communists 
refused to shatter totally the facade of unity within the communist 
movement. The PCF issued no absolute rejection of the Soviet Union, 
but rather continued its call to seek a politically palatable solution 
to the Czechoslovakia crisis. 
In an interview by Radio Luxembourg, Rochet restated the PCF "ap-
prehension" concerning the military occupation of Czechoslovakia. 61 
But while Rochet expressed disapproval of the Kremlin's decision, he 
reiterated that a political solution was still possible which allowed 
the "withdrawal of the intervening troops" and provided for "normaliza-
tion" of the situation in Czechoslovakia. 62 Such a political solution 
57 
appeared possible when Czechoslovakian and Soviet Union met in Moscow 
in late August and early September. During these meetings, Rochet and 
the PCF continued to state French communist disapproval of the inter-
vention and to express hope that a peaceful settlement could be found 
quickly so as to ease the disruption within the international communist 
movement. 
In the months that followed, the PCF continued to express disap-
proval of the invasion while maintaining the delicate position of non-
antagonism toward the Soviet Union. There was, however, one member of 
the PCF Central Committee who contradicted this attitude of continued 
solidarity with the Soviet Union. This man was a "liberal" named Roger 
Garaudy. Garaudy became an outspoken critic of the actions and policies 
of the Soviet Union. However, Garaudy was reprimanded by the Politburo 
for making remarks which were not in line with the policies of the PCF 
leadership. 63 In an article published in Paris on October 21 in the 
Nouvel Observateur, Garaudy stated: 
What has been condemned in Czechoslovakia is, essentially, 
the theses which we French Communist defend ••• it is 
the Czechs who have applied Leninist thought, while the 
Soviet leaders have given proof of Stalinist dogmatism.64 
However, when this comment appeared in the Observateur, Garaudy also 
"accepted official censure for his breaches of party discipline" which 
h • d 1 f h' II ' ' ' II ' 65 e rece1ve as a resu t o 1s rev1s1on1st v1ews. 
The October ~0-21 plenary session of the Central Committee of the 
PCF marked the climax of the PCF reaction to the Czechoslovakian 
crisis. A communique from the Central Committee was published in 
L1Humanite on October 22. Once again the PCF leadership espoused dis-
approval of the intervention in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, 
58 
and once again, it stated the PCF would "maintain" ties with the Com-
. p f h s . u . 66 mun1st arty o t e ov1et n1on. The communique reported the censure 
of Roger Garaudy for his divergence from the party line, and also re-
ported on the censure and resignation of Jeanette Thorez-Vermeersch, 
widow of-Maurice Thorez, who maintained "a contradictory and divergent 
position" from that of the Central Committee concerning the August in-
tervention.67 Thorez-Vermeersch argued that the Soviet Union was jus-
tified in the intervention. 68 On October 23 L'Humanite printed the 
report compiled by Gaston Plissonier for the PCF detailing the events 
in Czechoslovakia. The report was typical of such PCF statements. 
Plissonier pledged "solidarity" with the GPSU, complained of the mili-
tary incursion into Czechoslovakia, and explained that some biased in-
formation from the Soviet Union and the GDR "aimed at justifying the 
intervention" was being distributed in France. 69 As a denouement to 
the affair in 1968, the PCF published a resolution following. a meeting 
between George Marchais and the leaders of the CPSU in November. On 
December 7, 1968, the PCF approved again the conclusion of Marchais' 
meeting by reaffirming the unity with the CPSU and committing the 
French Communist Party to the "independence of every party and of pro-
1 ·, • • 1 • II 70 etar1an 1nternat1ona 1sm. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the invasion by the Soviet Union and the four members 
of the Warsaw Pact precipitated a divergence in PCF policy vis-a-vis 
the CPSU. For the first time in its existence, on August 21, 1968, the 
PCF publicly disapproved of actions taken by the CPSU and the four "fra-
ternal" Warsaw Pact states. Viewed from the perspective of the history 
of the confirmed allegiance to the Soviet Union by the French Communist 
Party, any divergence from the policies initiated by the Soviet Union 
and the CPSU was significant. However, the divergence was more than a 
politically expedient tactic. The PCF continued to declare its disap-
proval of the intervention policy. An investigation of L'Humanite's 
reports made it clear the French Communist Party did not merely react 
to the single event of the intervention in August, but rather followed 
the reforms in Czechoslovakia during the first eight months with obvious 
approvaL 
Reviewing the reports in L'Humanite from January to April, numerous 
articles appeared concerning the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. A 
comprehensive picture of the new democratic socialism envisioned by 
Alexander Dubcek was printed at times on a daily basis in L'Humanite. 
L'Humanite articles printed during the May to July period illustrated 
the efforts of the PCF to analyze and develop a policy for the de-
velopments in Czechoslovakia. By July, the PCF and Waldeck Rochet gave 
62 
63 
considerable support to a political solution to the Czechoslovak crisis. 
The PCF in :its actions and in its rhetoric condemned the Soviet Union 
for the invasion which ended the Czechoslovak reform movement. 
During this same time period the CPSU reacted in a significantly 
different way than the PCF. The silence or negative position taken by 
the Kremlin leaders was reflected in the reports in Pravda. From Janu-
ary until April the CPSU press covered superficially the events in 
Czechoslovakia~ concentrating as much on industrial output as on the 
political changes, mostly without any commentary. From April until 
August the news organs of the Soviet Union and the CPSU developed a neg-
ative posture toward the reforms of Alexander Dubcek's new government. 
This negative attitude at times developed into a heated exchange of 
printed attacks and counterattacks between the presses of the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia. From late August, with the invasion and oc-
cupation, until the end of the year, Pravda and other Soviet newspapers 
and publications concentrated upon the justification of the actions of 
the five Warsaw Pact countries. 
From a review of the two main party newspapers a divergence was 
evident. The traditional role of the French Communist Party as a vas-
sal of the CPSU in Western Europe clearly was shaken. However, the PCF 
continued a functional working relationship with the CPSU throughout 
1968 and in the following decade. The PCF refused to initiate any 
separate policy toward Czechoslovakia outside the framework and struc-
ture of the international communist movement. The French Communist 
Party insisted on pursuing options for a political settlement to the 
Czechoslovakian crisis in order not to reject the Communist Party of 
64 
the Soviet Union and to maintain the marginal unity in the international 
communist movement. 
The denunciation of the actions of the Soviet Union in its occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia remained a policy of the PCF in.to the 1970s. 
The PCF at times since the conflict in 1968 differed with the Soviet 
Union and the CPSU on issues concerning the international communist 
d . 1 F h 1· . l movement an 1nterna rene po 1t1cs. However, during the same time 
period, the PCF, with new Secretary Georges Marchais, aligned with the 
CPSU on subjects of ideological importance against the traditional foe 
Maoist China. The PCF leadership lauded Leonid Brezhnev for his trips 
to the United States and Western Europe in 1973 and praised the role of 
the Soviet Union in the victory of communism in Viet Nam in 1975. And, 
as late as 1978 the PCF and CPSU concerned on su~port for Viet Nam 
against Cambodia in those countries' armed conflict. Consequently, 
while the PCf maintained part of the independent posture initiated in 
1968, the French communists also maintained ties and allegiances with 
the Soviet Union to the present. 
These two positions, that of alignment and independence, formed 
the foundation of the PCF political structure. The PCF is a political 
party in France with ties to an international political movement-with a 
split role of nationalists and internationalists. The independence-
alignment posture was not inconsistent with the past positions taken 
by the PCF. Throughout its history the PCF has attempted accordance 
with the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. The actions taken 
by the French Communist Party in 1968 concerning the Czechoslovakian 
reform movement vis-a-vis the actions of the Soviet Union were remark-
able in the context of the PCF's past traditions. It was the most 
65 
independ~nt position ever taken by the PCF~ However, the PCF held to 
the unity of the entire international communist movement and strove for 
Rochet's "political solution" in order to preserve the faltering unity 
in global Marxism. 
The PCF appeared committed to the internationalism of the communist 
movement. The theory of the development of a distinct, separate Euro-
comrnunist movement with the PCF as an integral member, removed from the 
influences and policies of the CPSU, lacked credibility. The PCF con-
tinued to remain a client to the CPSU in Western Europe although less 
committed to Soviet dictates since 1968. The PCI and the smaller Span-
ish Communist Party tended to exercise a greater independence than the 
PCF in their dealings with the policy-makers in the Kremlin, but not 
enough to form a separate unit within the communist movement such as 
China. The evidence illustrated that the French Communist Party in 
1968 exhibited an independence from the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union heretofore unknown. Yet, the PCF continued to adhere to the in-
fluence and policies of the CPSU and the state it represents. 
FOOTNOTES 
1see New York Times (April 21 and September 15, 1977). 
2L'Humanite (October 16, 1976)./ 
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